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The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on 
Abortion Statutes 
John Christopher Ford 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the Supreme Court declared in 1973 that the Constitution 
grants women a limited right to an abortion,1 the Justices have de­
cided abortion cases with reference to such weighty matters as reli­
gious freedom,2 the disadvantaged position of women in society,3 
and the proper role of the judiciary.4 Understandably, the Supreme 
Court's writings on abortion deal extensively with these large 
themes. The Court, and certainly others, view abortion cases as ri­
valing Brown v. Board of Education5 in their importance to the na­
tion.6 While the Court has focused on the big issues, however, it 
has neglected an equally important, if less emotionally compelling, 
one: namely, under what circumstances should a statute restricting 
access to abortion be invalidated "on its face"? 
A litigant can attack the constitutionality of a statute either "on 
its face" or "as applied."7 The effect of a judicial decision depends 
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 {1973). This Note takes the existence of the constitu­
tional right to an abortion as a given. It takes no position on whether Roe and cases reaffirm­
ing the right to an abortion are sound constitutional decisions, nor does it take any position 
on the extent to which legislatures should attempt to restrict access to abortion, if any. 
2. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 565-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing the stance of the Roman Catholic 
Church, particularly St. Thomas Aquinas, in finding the preamble to a Missouri abortion law 
a violation of the Establishment Clause). 
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-94 {1992) (plurality opinion) 
{discussing spousal abuse statistics and sociological studies of women); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. 
for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 {1990) (Akron II) {Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(calling for protection of minor women who are "frightened and forlorn, lacking the comfort 
of loving parental guidance and mature advice." (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 
(1977))). 
4. See, e.g., Akron II, 491 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Leaving this matter to 
the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so . . . .  The court should end 
its disruptive intrusion into this field as soon as possible."). 
5. 347 U.S. 483 {1954). 
6. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 {1992) (stating that Brown and the abortion cases are 
unique in that they called "the contending sides of a national controversy to end their na­
tional division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution"). 
7. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. 
Ri::v. 235, 236 {1994). Attacks on the facial constitutionality of a state statute wind their way 
to the Supreme Court by one of two avenues: on appeal from an anticipatory action in the 
lower federal courts seeking to prevent enforcement of the statute, or on appeal from a state 
case in which the statute was actually enforced. This Note deals almost exclusively with the 
first category of cases, which are the most common in the abortion context. See, e.g., Hodg­
son v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
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greatly on which type of challenge is brought to the Court.8 When 
the Supreme Court declares a state statute unconstitutional as ap­
plied to a particular defendant, the state cannot apply the statute to 
the defendant's protected conduct. The state may, however, con­
tinue enforcing the statute against all others.9 When the Supreme 
Court upholds a facial challenge, however, enforcement must stop 
altogether.to Successful facial challenges, in short, nullify a state 
law.11 
The standard by which to evaluate facial attacks on statutes that 
restrict women's access to abortion services has become a momen­
tous issue for a variety of reasons. First, facial challenges, rather 
than as-applied challenges, are the norm in the abortion arena, as 
physicians and interest groups such as Planned Parenthood regu­
larly seek to have state statutes struck down in their entirety.12 Sec­
ond, since Planned Parenthood v. Casey's13 strong reaffirmation of 
the existence of a constitutional right to an abortion in 1992, states 
defending laws that restrict women's access to abortion increasingly 
use the standard of review for facial attacks as a legal tool to pre-
8. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 236. 
9. See Lawrence A. Alexander, ls There An Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN Drnoo L. 
REV. 541, 542-43 (1985); Dorf, supra note 7, at 236. "As applied" challenges generally re­
quire the court to determine whether or not a challenger's activity was constitutionally pro­
tected. If so, the court interprets the law in a way that exonerates the challenger and in doing 
so "trim[s] down" the law to its constitutional size. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITU· 
TIONAL LAW 1192 (12th ed. 1991). This process is widely known as "severability." 
10. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 236; Richard H. Fallon, Jr .• Making Sense of Overbreadth, 
100 YALE L.J. 853. 853 (1991). 
11. This is a slight overstatement. Because the Supreme Court does not have the power 
to actually repeal state statutes, and because the meaning of state statutes is a matter of state 
law, see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992), state prosecutors theoreti­
cally can seek new, constitutionally permissible interpretations of a statute even after the 
Supreme Court has "struck down" a previous interpretation. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479, 491 (1964) (finding Louisiana's Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law 
void on its face but stating that Louisiana could "assume the burden of obtaining a permissi­
ble narrow construction in a noncriminal proceeding"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489, 492-508 (1954). They rarely do this. 
See Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con Law is as Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 992 (1995) 
("The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional 'on its face' is to render it com­
pletely inoperative."). 
When a federal court other than the Supreme Court finds a state law facially invalid, the 
state does not even have to wait for a narrowing construction. Because the lower federal 
courts stand parallel to and not above state courts, state prosecutors may continue to enforce 
a statute in state court even after a lower federal court has found it facially invalid. See, e.g., 
Women's Servs., P.C. v. Douglas, 653 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that "a federal 
plaintiffs [successful] constitutional attack . . •  would benefit only that plaintiff: 'the State is 
free to prosecute others who may violate the statute' " (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 
922, 931 (1975))). Even in these situations, however, states very rarely continue to prosecute 
violations of the statute. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 888 n.219. 
12. See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993) (as­
serting a facial attack to a North Dakota statute restricting abortion). 
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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serve the operation of their laws. Prior to Casey, many states had 
argued that Roe itself should be overturned.14 Third, by definition, 
the standard for evaluating a facial attack determines how convinc­
ing the facial challengers' showing of unconstitutionality must be in 
order to win their case. Tue choice between a more or less strin­
gent standard determines, in borderline cases, whether a constitu­
tionally questionable statute will be struck down as a whole or 
remain vital, subject only to as-applied challenges brought by ag­
grieved individuals. is 
Sensitive to the significant effect of facial invalidation generally, 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno16 announced a test, 
which this Note labels the "no-set-of-circumstances test," making it 
nearly impossible to succeed on a facial attack. Without citing pre­
cedent, the Salerno majority stated that "[a] facial challenge to a 
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of cir­
cumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."17 Salerno 
created - or perhaps merely recognized - a bifurcated structure 
for evaluating facial attacks. On the first tier lie cases involving 
First Amendment rights, in which the overbreadth standard con­
trols facial attacks. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doc­
trine, facial challengers succeed upon proof that a questioned 
statute is capable of a "substantial number" of unconstitutional ap­
plications.1s On the second tier rest all other facial attacks, and 
they are governed by the no-set-of-circumstances test.19 
The no-set-of-circumstances test has appropriately been called 
"draconian" in effect, rendering it nearly impossible to succeed on a 
facial challenge.20 This is especially true in the abortion context. If 
the Supreme Court were faithful to Salerno, it would reject every 
14. Casey held that a state can place a legislative ban on abortions after the point at 
which a fetus becomes viable. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. Before viability, the state can 
attempt to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, but it cannot place an undue burden 
on that choice. See 505 U.S. at 878. An undue burden is a provision with the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. See 505 
U.S. at 878. 
15. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1454-57 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
the choice between two facial standards "may well determine the outcome of this case"). 
16. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
17. 481 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added). Interestingly, this no-set-of-circumstances test was 
not at all central to the holding of Salerno. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 240-41. 
18. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1982). 
19. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 ("The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate un­
constitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it 
wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited 
context of the First Amendment."). 
20. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 239-40. 
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facial attack on statutes restricting access to abortions.21 For in­
stance, it would have to reject a facial challenge to a law declaring 
all abortions illegal because the law could be applied constitution­
ally to a woman who is eight months pregnant - that is, after all, 
one circumstance in which a state undoubtedly has the constitu­
tional authority to prohibit an abortion.22 
The Court has not followed that course. It has never made pre­
cisely clear, however, what standard it does use to evaluate the fa­
cial attacks before it in the abortion context.23 Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey muddied the waters even more. The plurality decision 
used a standard of review markedly different from the no-set-of­
circumstances test. In striking down Pennsylvania's husband­
notification requirement24 - and without breathing a word of its 
departure from Salemo - the plurality explained that the require­
ment was facially invalid for the following reason: "[I]n a large 
fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant, it will operate as a 
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."25 
This test shows much less deference to statutes than the no-set-of­
circumstances test. Instead of having to prove the unconstitutional­
ity of every conceivable application of a statute, the Casey plaintiffs 
only needed to show that a "large fraction" of applications would 
infringe on constitutional rights in order to invalidate the statute's 
provisions. 26 
21. This does not mean, of course, that the law would remain a valid restriction against all 
women. It could only be narrowed, however, through as-applied challenges. 
22. For instance, Guam passed a law preventing abortions unless two doctors indepen­
dently confinn that the pregnancy poses a serious health risk to the woman. See Guam Socy. 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1368 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 1011 (1992). Justice Scalia, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argued that the 
lower courts incorrectly upheld the facial challenge because the Guam law could be applied 
constitutionally to the "set of circumstances" in which a woman in the post-viability stage of 
her pregnancy sought an abortion. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecolo­
gists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011-13 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Scalia's analy­
sis under Salerno is unquestionably correct because neither Roe nor Casey prevent the state 
from prohibiting such late-tenn abortions. "If there is a flaw in [Scalia's] argument, it lies 
with Salerno itself." Dorf, supra note 7, at 238. 
23. See infra notes 46-69 and accompanying text. 
24. The husband-notification requirement required a physician perfonning an abortion 
on a married woman to obtain a signed statement from the woman declaring that she had 
infonned her husband that she was going to have an abortion. Exceptions were provided in 
cases of medical emergency, or where the woman provided an alternative signed statement 
declaring that her husband did not impregnate her, that her husband could not be located, 
that the pregnancy resulted from spousal sexual assault which she reported, or that notifying 
the husband would cause him or someone else to inflict bodily hann on her. See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (citing the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act 
of 1982, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3209 (1990)). 
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. 
26. Ironically, the break from Salerno came in an opinion which not only extolled the 
virtues of stare decisis but adhered to that doctrine. In an appropriately described "act of 
personal courage and constitutional principle," Casey, 505 U.S. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concur­
ring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), the members of the 
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The various opinions in Casey dealt largely with the question of 
whether to overrule Roe v. Wade. 27 They did not address at any 
great length the standard for evaluating facial challenges, which 
once again was relegated to sideline status in the most celebrated 
legal debate of the late twentieth century.28 
Casey left lower federal courts to face the difficult question of 
whether Casey silently established a new standard of review for fa­
cial attacks on statutes restricting abortions or whether the no-set­
of-circumstances test applies to abortion cases. The federal courts 
of appeals have come to divergent conclusions.29 In Barnes v. 
Moore,30 the Fifth Circuit noted that Casey "may have applied" a 
new standard, but ultimately followed Salemo. 31 The Barnes court 
further justified its decision by analogizing the statute at issue, 
which it did not strike down, to parts of the Pennsylvania statute 
found valid in Casey, 32 a technique which many courts adjudicating 
facial challenges have used.33 In contrast, on remand, the Third 
plurality rested their reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade on stare decisis despite a palpable distaste 
for that decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 ("Roe . . •  may be seen . . .  as a rule (whether or 
not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity."), 864 ("[A] decision to overrule 
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly 
decided."), 869 ("A decision to overrule Roe[] . . .  would address error, if error there was, at 
the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy."). 
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
28. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the plurality's inconsistency with Salerno in a footnote. 
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 973 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent­
ing in part). Justice Blackmun likewise recognized, but did not elaborate on, the fact that the 
plurality had used a novel test for facial attacks. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 924-25 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Those were 
the only two comments on the rather striking development that seems to have occurred. 
29. For an extended discussion of the confusion over the facial challenge standard, see 
Tholen & Baird, supra note 11, at 1004-17 (1995). See also, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. 
Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1457 (8th Cir. 1995). 
30. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992). 
31. See 970 F.2d at 14 n.2. The next two Fifth Circuit cases also followed Salerno. See 
Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993); Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
In Sojourner T., the court said only that "the plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the 
Statute. Thus, we must determine whether the plaintiffs are correct that the Statute cannot 
be construed and applied without infringing upon constitutionally protected rights." So­
journer T., 974 F.2d at 30 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991)). The court, in 
striking the restrictive Jaw, reached the wrong result under Salerno. The statute prohibited 
all abortions except those necessary to preserve the life or health of the unborn baby, to 
remove the dead unborn child, to save the life of the mother, or when conception occurred 
by rape or incest. The statute could be applied, however. with no constitutional infirmity to a 
healthy woman carrying a viable fetus that was not the product of rape or incest. 
32. See Barnes, 970 F.2d at 14-15 ("[W]e conclude that the differences between the Mis­
sissippi and Pennsylvania Acts are not sufficient to render the former unconstitutional on its 
face."). 
33. See Tholen & Baird, supra note 11, at 1011-12, 1021-22. For examples of this ap­
proach, see Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 530 (8th Cir. 1994); Jane L. v. 
Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992), affd. in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 61 
F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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Circuit found that Casey set a new standard.34 The Eighth Circuit, 
after initially avoiding the issue, also found that Casey "effectively 
overruled Salemo for facial challenges to abortion statutes."35 At 
the Supreme Court level, two of Casey's three-member plurality, 
Justices O'Connor and Souter, have stated that Casey overruled Sa­
lerno,36 while Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, in contrast, have stated 
that Salerno should control abortion cases.37 
This Note argues that Planned Parenthood v. Casey established 
a new standard for facial attacks on abortion laws and that it is the 
correct one to apply to any facial attack on state statutes that alleg­
edly infringe on the constitutional right to have an abortion. Part I 
of this Note argues that the Casey test is in harmony with previous 
abortion decisions, and that these decisions have drawn heavily on 
the overbreadth doctrine used to adjudicate facial challenges based 
on the First Amendment. Part I then demonstrates why the theo­
retical justifications for the overbreadth doctrine suggest that it 
should be applied to abortion cases as well. Part II explains how a 
judicial analysis under the new Casey standard should proceed. It 
concludes that the Casey test's emphasis on the factual record 
makes it superior to current First Amendment overbreadth juris­
prudence for use in abortion cases. 
I. 0VERBREADTH DOCTRINE IS MORE APPROPRIATE FOR 
AB ORTION CASES THAN THE SALERNO No-SET-OF­
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
Overbreadth, like obscenity, undoubtedly exists but is very diffi­
cult to define.38 Most can agree on at least this much: the over­
breadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge the constitutionality 
of a statute, regardless of whether the litigant's own conduct is con­
stitutionally protected, on the basis that the statute prohibits other 
persons' protected conduct.39 This type of analysis is an exception 
to the often-invoked rule that "a person to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the 
34. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994). 
35. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995). 
36. See Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (O'Connor, J., concurring in order denying application for 
stay and injunction pending appeal). 
37. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011-13 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
38. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 542 ("The most notable fact about the [overbreadth] 
doctrine . . .  is that what it is and what justifies it remain the subjects of controversy and 
confusion."). 
39. See id. at541-42;see
.
also, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
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ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to 
others in situations not before the Court."40 
For instance, in one overbreadth case, a defendant was charged 
under a Houston ordinance making it a crime to "interrupt any po­
liceman in the execution of his duty."41 The defendant had at­
tempted to distract some police officers from arresting his friends.42 
Despite the fact that his own activity may very well not have been 
protected under the First Amendment, his overbreadth claim suc­
ceeded, and the ordinance was struck down on its face, because the 
ordinance could have applied to the protected speech of other peo­
ple not before the court.43 For example, a person who calmly utters 
a political statement might inadvertently "interrupt" a policeman, 
although that person's speech undoubtedly could not become the 
basis for a prosecution as it is clearly protected by the First 
Amendment. 
It is true, of course, that the Salerno test for facial challenges -
the no-set-of-circumstances test - allows a litigant to attack a law 
based on factual situations not immediately before the Court. The 
challenger is asked to prove, after all, that every conceivable appli­
cation of the law will be unconstitutional. The no-set-of­
circumstances test, however, differs from overbreadth in two vital 
respects. First, the overbreadth standard does not require proof 
that every application not before the court will be unconstitutional. 
It merely requires a showing that some significant number of un­
constitutional applications will result. Second, because of the all­
embracing nature of the no-set-of-circumstances test, a litigant 
40. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1982) (citations omitted) ("What has come 
to be known as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is one of the few exceptions to 
this principle . . . .  "); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 n.8 (1984) (citing cases). This 
rule derives from the presumption that any invalid application of a law may be "severed" 
from its valid applications. 
It is also important to note that despite this prudential rule, the Article III-based standing 
requirement permits the Court to hear any case in which a litigant has a "personal stake" in 
the outcome. See Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third­
Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 394 (1981) 
(citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 123 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-
500 (1975)). Thus, while a criminal defendant has standing to challenge a law she is prose­
cuted under, the prudential rule may prohibit that defendant from raising the constitutional 
concerns of other parties not before the court. See generally Note, Standing to Assert Consti­
tutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423 (1974). This Note does not address the possible 
"personal stake," or constitutional-level standing problems, which arise when a group such as 
Planned Parenthood challenges a law. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Singleton, 
428 U.S. at 112, 123; PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 123-25 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disin­
tegration of Article Ill, 14 CAL. L. REv. 1915 (1986). 
41. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 455 (1987) (citing HousToN, True, CoDE § 34-ll(a) 
(1984)). 
42 . See Hill, 482 U.S. at 453. 
43. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 458-67. 
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making a challenge under it would have to show that even her own 
activity was constitutionally protected. Thus, if the defendant 
above were to make a challenge based on the no-set-of-circum­
stances test, he would have been required to argue that even his 
own act of disrupting the policeman to save his friends was pro­
tected by the First Amendment. Thus, the no-set-of-circumstances 
test does not proceed, as overbreadth analysis does, without regard 
to the challenger's actions. 
This Part explains that the Casey plurality used an overbreadth 
theory, rather than the no-set-of-circumstances test, and that it was 
right to do so.44 Section I.A reviews Supreme Court abortion juris­
prudence, including Casey, and concludes that an unarticulated 
overbreadth theory has, in fact, been used all along. The Casey 
standard, therefore, is consistent with, not a departure from, the 
Court's treatment of abortion cases. Section I.B examines the two 
theories said to underlie the overbreadth doctrine and shows that 
each of the theories indicates that overbreadth analysis should ex­
tend to the abortion context. 
A. The Supreme Court Has in Fact Applied Overbreadth to 
Abortion Cases 
Despite statements to the contrary,45 the Court has used the 
overbreadth doctrine in abortion cases both before and after the 
development of the no-set-of-circumstances test in Salerno. In Roe, 
the plaintiff brought a facial attack against a Texas statute criminal­
izing most abortions.46 After enunciating the trimester framework 
for analyzing restrictions on a woman's right to have an abortion,47 
the Roe majority appealed to the overbreadth doctrine: 
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, 
in restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by med­
ical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps 
44. Although this section will refer to overbreadth as if it were one well-defined doctrine, 
in actuality there are many possible formulations. In Part II, this Note will argue that the 
formulation voiced in Casey is preferable to the current First Amendment overbreadth stan­
dard. See infra notes 110-43. 
45. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (stating that overbreadth is exclu­
sively a First Amendment concept). 
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973). Roe held (i) that during approximately 
the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision must be left to the pregnant woman 
and her physician, (ii) that after the first trimester, the state may regulate abortion proce­
dures in ways reasonably related to its interest in the health of the mother, and (iii) that after 
the point of viability, approximately simultaneous with the start of the third trimester, the 
state may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary to preserve the life 
or health of the woman. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
47. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
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too broadly . . . . The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitu­
tional attack made upon it here.48 
Similarly, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, 49 the Court used a chilling-effect rationale - which, as 
noted below, derives from the overbreadth doctrine5o - to strike 
down provisions of an Ohio abortion statute. The majority stated 
that Ohio's requirement that all abortions after the first trimester 
take place in a hospital had "the effect of inhibiting . . . the vast 
majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks."51 Akron found it 
important that a "vast majority" of unconstitutional applications 
would occur - it did not demand that every contemplated abortion 
after the first twelve weeks be inhibited. 
In addition to Akron and Roe, other abortion cases arising 
before Salerno also used the overbreadth rationale.52 If the Court 
had been using a Salerno no-set-of-circumstances test in these cases, 
it would have been forced to uphold the statutes. Even the most 
restrictive abortion laws, after all, can be applied constitutionally to 
a woman in the post-viability stage of her pregnancy and not facing 
a grave threat to her health.53 Indeed, the use of overbreadth anal-
48. 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added); see also Ada v. Guam Secy. of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 505 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("The 
Court's first opinion in the abortion area, Roe v. Wade, seemingly employed an 'overbreadth' 
approach - though without mentioning the term and without analysis." (citation omitted)). 
Lower court decisions on the same issue that pre-dated Roe also employed overbreadth anal­
ysis. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55 (citing Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972); 
Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. 
Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 
1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 
(D.N.J. 1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970); People v. Belous, 458 
P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972)). 
49. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
50. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. 
51. Akron, 462 U.S. at 438 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 
(1976)). 
52. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 763, 769 (1986) (noting effect of state-distributed literature on rape victims without stat­
ing that any plaintiff was impregnated through rape and finding the statute that called for the 
distribution facially invalid); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 632 (1979) (quoting lower court's 
characterization of the case as an overbreadth issue); Collauti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 385, 
390 (1979) (not reaching the "overbreadth" claim); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71 (following Roe 
and using the chilling-effect rationale); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973) (explicitly 
using overbreadth analysis); cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976) (noting that 
chilling effect justifies granting physicians jus tertii to assert the rights of patients). But see 
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405-07 (1981) (considering only the as-applied challenge of 
an immature minor and refusing to rule on the statute's impact on mature minors). Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmon and Brennan, dissented in Matheson, declaring that 
the Court should have ruled the law overbroad. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 427 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
53. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011-12 
(1992) ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
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ysis in abortion cases prior to Salerno is nearly indisputable.s4 As 
with the sun's daily rising, some, like the tired farmhand, may la­
ment it,55 others, like the rooster, relish it,56 and others simply ac­
cept it.57 Very few indeed deny it.ss 
Strangely, the establishment of the Salerno test did not signifi­
cantly reduce the Supreme Court's use of overbreadth analysis in 
abortion cases. Justice O'Connor first invoked the no-set-of­
circumstances rule in a concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services.59 While her Salerno analysis was analytically 
sound, the argument was largely ignored. 6o Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, responded in a footnote 
without explaining his reasons for rejecting the apparently good 
law, stating simply "I disagree" with this approach.61 Salerno grad­
uated to a plurality opinion in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproduc­
tive Health (Akron 11).62 In Akron II, however, Salerno was used 
54. See Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1347 n.10 {5th Cir. 1993) (Johnson, J,, dis­
senting); Fallon, supra note 10, at 859. 
55. See, e.g., Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011-13 ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
56. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 539-41 {1989) {Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that Missouri statute establishing beginning of life at conception will 
have chilling effect on those seeking abortion). 
57. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 { Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he record identifies a suffi­
cient number of unconstitutional applications to support the Court of Appeals' judgment 
invalidating those provisions."). 
58. Justice O'Connor is the only member of the court to have done this. In Webster, she 
noted the possibility that the statute in question could conceivably limit the use of certain 
forms of contraception in a manner unconstitutional under Griswold. O'Connor believed, 
however, that "all of these intimations of unconstitutionality are simply too hypothetical to 
support the use of declaratory judgement procedures and injunctive remedies in this case." 
Webster, 492 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
"Maher, Poelker, and McRae stand for the proposition that some quite straightforward appli­
cations of the Missouri ban ... would be constitutional and that is enough to defeat appel­
lees' assertion that the ban is facially unconstitutional." Webster, 492 U.S. at 524 {O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The cases O'Connor cites all uphold 
government restrictions on abortion funding. In none of them, however, does the Court note 
even one possible unconstitutional application of the statutes. Thus, in those cases, the Court 
never had to decide whether to use overbreadth or a Salerno-type standard. See Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 {1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 {1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 
{1977). 
59. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
60. The neglect of the Salerno rule is particularly troubling in Webster, an abortion case 
unique in its lengthy argument over whether the Court should have reached the abortion 
issue at all. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 520-21 {plurality), 523-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment), 532-37 ( Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment), 542, 554 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 560-61 
( Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
61. Webster, 492 U.S. at 539 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
62. 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990) ("In addition, because appellees are making a facial chal­
lenge to a statute, they must show that 'no set of circumstances exists under which the Act 
would be valid.'" (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))). 
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merely as makeweight; discussion of the rule did not extend one full 
paragraph.63 The Salerno rule continued its ascent in Rust v. Sulli­
van, 64 which involved a facial attack on federal regulations restrict­
ing abortion counselling. The Court cited the no-set-of­
circumstances standard at the beginning of its discussion, and re­
mained aware throughout the opinion of the case's status as a facial 
attack.65 Despite these few mentions of Salerno, the Court contin­
ued to employ overbreadth analysis in its abortion decisions, even if 
it did not explicitly admit to doing so. 66 
The Casey decision, rather than sweeping the issue under the 
rug, however, as other cases might be said to have done, laid out a 
new standard that draws on overbreadth principles. The distin­
guishing characteristic of overbreadth analysis, as noted above, is 
that it allows litigants to challenge a law, regardless of what their 
own (actual or contemplated) behavior is, on the basis that the law 
will unconstitutionally restrict some significant number of persons 
not before the court. Accordingly, Casey upheld the challengers' 
argument against the husband-notification provision based on its 
conclusion that the requirement would act as an unconstitutional 
burden on a large fraction of women.67 In order to uphold the fa-
63. See Akron II, 497 U. S. at 514. 
64. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
65. Interestingly, Rust contains at least one sign that the Court may have been ready to 
temper the Salerno test, perhaps in order to be able to apply it more regularly without mak­
ing a radical change in the Court's approach to abortion cases. Rust declares that the regula­
tions survive the facial challenge because they can be applied to "a set of individuals without 
infringing upon constitutionally protected rights."  Rust, 500 U. S. at 183. It may have been in 
the mind of the Court that the "set of individuals" test - a phrase susceptible to later refine­
ment - could be crafted to Jess "draconian" effect than the no-set-of-circumstances test, 
which upholds a Jaw capable of being applied to only one person constitutionally. 
66. See Belloti v. Baird, 443 U. S. at 627 n.5 (stating that "[i]t is apparent from the District 
Court's opinions, however, that it considered the constitutionality of [the abortion statute] as 
applied to all pregnant minors who might be affected by it," and accepting that "the rights of 
this entire category of minors properly were subject to adjudication" even though no imma­
ture minors were before the court). In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990), the Court 
found no legitimate state interest served by a two-parent notification provision as applied to 
families in which one notified parent would not notify the other. See Hodgson, 497 U. S. at 
450. It also found legitimate state interests disserved in the case of dysfunctional families. 
See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450-51. The Court, however, as well as the district court below, did 
not establish that any of the plaintiffs came from dysfunctional families or families in which a 
notified parent would not notify the other. See Hodgson, 497 U. S. 417; Hodgson v. Minne­
sota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 759 (D. Minn. 1986). Rather, the Court based its conclusion of uncon­
stitutionality on the effect the Jaw was having on the general population, and made no 
attempt to relate those findings back to the plaintiff class. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 437-39. 
The district court likewise failed to do so. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768. 
67. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 276 ("The Casey plurality thus applied 'substantial over­
breadth' analysis."). In some cases, courts will allow a party to assert the rights of one partic­
ular person not before the court, such as his medical patient, without entertaining an 
overbreadth argument in which the party can point to the effect that a statute will have on 
virtually anyone. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976) (allowing a physician to 
assert the rights of his patient); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (allowing a white 
seller of land to assert the constitutional rights of a prospective African-American buyer). 
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cial attack under the no-set-of-circumstances test, the plurality 
would have needed to conclude that the notification provision 
amounted to an unconstitutional barrier for all women, which it ex­
plicitly refused to do.6s 
While the historical use of overbreadth analysis in abortion 
cases is fairly clear, a resurgent force has discovered the discrepancy 
between Salerno and Casey and asserts that the Salerno standard 
should control.69 A cynic might declare that some judges are using 
the nearly impossible to satisfy Salerno test as a tool - a kind of 
last-ditch measure - to preserve the enforceability of new abortion 
laws which violate the undue-burden standard.70 Whatever the rea­
son, a new dispute has emerged. 
B. Overbreadth Theory Supports its Use in Abortion Cases 
Although most agree that the overbreadth doctrine exists, the 
justifications offered for the doctrine are conflicting at best and sim­
ply not understood at worst.71 This section briefly summarizes the 
two primary justifications and demonstrates their consistency with 
the thesis advanced here - that some form of overbreadth analysis 
This is called standing to assertjus tertiL See BATOR ET AL., supra note 40, at 169-70. Though 
this conceivably may have occurred in Casey, none of the adjudicating courts required the 
clinics or their physicians to prove that the husband-notification provision would operate as a 
restriction on any of their patients. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991); Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
68. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (accepting respondents' argument that ninety-five percent 
of married women notify their husbands voluntarily). 
69. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) 
( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992); Jane 
L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992), affd. in part, reversed in part on other 
grounds, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995). 
70. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More than 
one commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court's standing inquiry is 
not more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying claim."). 
At least in one instance, a Justice's position on the Salerno-Casey debate seems to be self­
contradictory. Justice Scalia, who now believes Salerno calls for a restrained approach to 
adjudication of abortion laws, see Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011-13 (citing United States v. Salemo, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), once declared in the same context that the court should not "be 
run into a comer before . . .  grudgingly yield(ing] up our judgment." Webster v. Reproduc­
tive Health Servs., 492 U. S. 490, 535 (1989) ( Scalia, J., concurring). In that case, Justice 
Scalia argued - at a time when the overturning of Roe seemed eminently possible - for a 
reconsideration of abortion law in light of the fact that Missouri's abortion statute would 
"sometimes" act as an unconstitutional restraint on physicians. Webster, 492 U. S. at 536-37. 
After Casey, however, which has somewhat solidified Roe, Justice Scalia has stated that the 
fact that a law will sometimes operate unconstitutionally is not a reason to entertain a facial 
challenge. See Ada, 506 U. S. at 1011-13 ( Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
71. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 9, at 542 ("The most notable fact about the [over­
breadth] doctrine, however, is that what it is and what justifies it remain the subjects of 
controversy and confusion."); Fallon, supra note 10, at 853 ("More than fifty years after its 
inception, First Amendment overbreadth doctrine remains little understood." (citation 
omitted)). 
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should be applied to abortion cases. Section I.B.1 explains why the 
"third-party-standing" rationale supports the extension of over­
breadth analysis to the abortion context, and section I.B.2 does the 
same for the "valid-rule-of-law" theory. 
1. The "Third-Party-Standing" Theory Requires Extension to 
Laws Infringing Abortion Rights and Beyond 
The overbreadth doctrine, according to some, allows litigants 
"third-party standing" - an opportunity to assert the rights of hy­
pothetical persons not before the court.72 This view finds ample 
authority to support it in the Supreme Court's regular characteriza­
tion of the overbreadth doctrine as a unique standing rule.73 
Writers and judges justify the standing rule as being necessary to 
protected against a theorized, and dreaded, "chilling effect. "74 To 
illustrate with an actual - albeit extreme - case, a chilling effect 
would occur if a ban on "all First Amendment activity" at the Los 
Angeles airport caused some travelers to forgo wearing shirts em­
blazoned with political messages or to forgo engaging in other ex­
pression protected by the First Amendment at the airport. Because 
these people never break the rule in the first place, they are never 
prosecuted, and courts never hear the constitutional arguments that 
the chilled parties would make against the law.75 The standing 
component of the overbreadth doctrine vindicates the constitu­
tional claims of these people by allowing other litigants to raise 
them.76 
72. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1023 (2nd ed. 
1988); David S. Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 Mn. L. REV. 679, 705 
(1978); Fallon, supra note 10 at 867-70; Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amend­
ment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1978). This type of third­
party standing can be distinguished from jus tertii, standing to assert the rights of identifiable 
third parties. 
73. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555 (1993) ("The 'overbreadth' 
doctrine ... is a departure from traditional rules of standing."); Village of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("[T]he court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit - in 
the First Amendment area - 'attacks on overly broad statutes ... .' "). 
74. See generally Schauer, supra note 72. 
75. The chilling effect has most poetically been analogized to the sword which Dionysus 
hung by a single hair over legendary courtier Damocles' head to demonstrate the precarious 
nature of happiness. See JUDY PEARSALL & BILL TRUMBLE EDS., THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPE­
DIC DrcnoNARY (2d ed. 1995). Like the chilling effect, "the value of a Sword of Damocles is 
that it hangs - not that it drops." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
76. This line of reasoning can be found in several cases. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 
U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971) (White, J., 
dissenting); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); see also Schauer, supra note 72, at 685 ("[T)he concept of the 
chilling effect has grown from an emotive argument into a major substantive component of 
First Amendment adjudication .... [T)he potential deterrent effect of a vague, or more com-
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It is hard to believe that restrictive abortion laws do not have a 
chilling effect which is equal to, if not greater than, restrictive 
speech laws.77 Typically, women seek the aid of a doctor when at­
tempting to obtain an abortion. The clinics that women visit per­
form abortions on a regular basis;78 therefore, those institutions are 
likely to be well-informed of state abortion law. Thus, if a woman 
seeking an abortion does not initially know of the restrictions her 
state places on abortions, she will meet with people whose aid is 
vital to the implementation of her decision, who will require that 
she comply with state restrictions on abortion.79 The abortion pro­
cedure all but ensures that the chilling effect will be very icy when 
directed toward women seeking to have an abortion.8° Further­
more, because of the emotional nature of the abortion debate, the 
media heavily cover the passage of restrictive abortion laws, making 
it likely that pregnant women will have some knowledge of the 
state law that applies to them. 
Even those women who are undeterred by knowledge of the law 
may be chilled from asserting their rights as a result of the brevity 
of the gestation period.Bl A woman's constitutional right to an 
abortion lasts less than six months; a lawsuit can last much longer. 
That is, by the time a woman becomes pregnant - and, therefore, 
has an incentive to go to court to vindicate her rights - she may 
well feel it is already too late to redress the infringement on her 
rights. 
This subsection confronts three major arguments for limiting 
chilling-effect theory to First Amendment cases.82 The first argu-
monly, an overbroad statute, was seen as reason enough to bend traditional rules of stand­
ing." (citation omitted)). 
77. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 40, at 188 (questioning the limitation of the chilling 
effect rationale to the First Amendment area). 
78. See THE NEW OuR BODIES, OURSELVES 299 (Jane Pineus & Wendy Sanford eds., 2d 
ed. 1984) (noting that most first-trimester abortions are performed in clinics with a focus on 
abortion). 
79. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (suit brought after doctor insisted that 
minor woman comply with parental-notification law). 
80. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 271 (noting that the introduction of third parties increases 
the susceptibility of a woman to the chilling effect). A woman who forgoes a visit to the 
doctor out of fear that her constitutionally permissible abortion is illegal has already felt the 
chill. 
The preceding discussion vindicates one scholar's prophecy that "it is not far-fetched to 
imagine that there are many cases in which those whose conduct is most subject to chill will 
number among those who are most knowledgeable about decisional as well as statutory law." 
Fallon, supra note 10, at 887. This assertion derived from the logical thought that the extent 
of public awareness of any given state statute depends on the nature of the statute. Id. at 885. 
81. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). 
82. The fact that chilling-effect theory applies outside of the First Amendment context 
has been contemplated by other authorities. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 884 n.192 ("Much 
of my argument concerning the proper contours of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine 
would support a doctrine of equal sweep in cases involving alleged infringements of other 
fundamental rights."). 
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ment against the expansion of chilling-effect theory is that it 
wrongly assumes citizens know the content of the laws on the 
books.83 Though persuasive, this criticism applies to First Amend­
ment cases more so than abortion cases. The paragraphs above ex­
plain why a woman is virtually certain to become aware of the 
content of state law regarding abortion restrictions. In contrast, 
when a state passes a law abridging free speech, it may receive 
some media attention, but no governmental or private agent will 
inform a speaker of the law just as the speaker is about to open her 
mouth. Nor will an agent always be around to enforce compliance 
with the law, as occurs in the abortion context, by silencing the 
speaker just at the moment she decides to utter her constitutionally 
protected remarks. 
The second argument against extension of the �hilling-effect 
theory can be stated simply: Because overbreadth, is "strong 
medicine,"84 the judiciary should use it sparingly and in small 
doses.85 If this argument is valid, it can only justify heightening the 
standard for successful overbreadth challenges across the board.86 
It cannot rightly be used to discriminate between constitutional 
rights unless one right is more important than others.87 
83. See id. at 885; Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, The Burger Court and the First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, at 1040-41 (1984); Note, Over­
breadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532, 546 (1974). This argument, 
very persuasive in this form, holds even more weight in the case of a statute that has been 
saved from an overbreadth challenge by a limiting construction placed on it by state courts 
because citizens are not at all likely to possess any knowledge of state judicial decisions. See 
Fallon, supra note 10, at 885. 
84. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). This therapeutic metaphor has 
captured the imagination of courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 
U.S.103, 122 (1990) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
769 (1982) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613); Redish, supra note 83, at 1040 (quoting 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613). Efforts to deviate from it have not succeeded. See Goguen v. 
Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1972) ("[O]verbreadth technique is a powerful weapon which 
... should be applied gingerly."). 
85. A similar argument, which suffers identical problems, is that the overbreadth doctrine 
causes federal courts to exceed their proper authority. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 
(1971) ("Procedures for testing the constitutionality of a statute 'on its face' ... are funda­
mentally at odds with the function of the federal courts in our constitutional plan."). 
86. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 ("[W]e have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is 
'strong medicine' and have employed it with hesitation, and then 'only as a last resort.' We 
have, in consequence, insisted that the overbreadth be 'substantial' before the statute involved 
will be invalidated on its face.'' (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). 
87. One could, of course, suggest the First Amendment be our stopping point out of 
simple fear of the slippery slope. It is true that the argument made here with regard to 
abortion rights could be extended to any other fundamental right embodied in the Four­
teenth Amendment - for example, the right to use contraception. This Note does not ad­
dress those cases. It should alleviate the fears of the wary to note that, in this context, the 
slope, while perhaps steep, is very short. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 269 (arguing that over­
breadth, at its extreme, would extend only to First Amendment rights and privacy rights). 
Admittedly, this issue has already come up in "right to die" cases, see People v. Kevor­
kian, 447 Mich. 436, 467-68 n.33 (1995) (noting that the choice between Salerno and Casey 
must be made if the right to die is recognized); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 
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This leads directly to the third argument for limiting over­
breadth to the First Amendment context: the right of free expres­
sion is indeed a "preferred" right and therefore deserves the 
greatest protection.ss While the preeminence of the First Amend­
ment is often asserted without much discussion,s9 those assertions 
do not justify limiting overbreadth analysis to the First Amendment 
context. One argument regarding the pre-eminence of the First 
Amendment states that a deprivation of the right of expression 
works an injustice to an entire community that fails to hear censored 
speech, while deprivation of other individual rights merely damages 
the individual concemed.90 The premise of this argument is flawed. 
Often, a citizen exercises his right of free speech before an ex­
tremely limited audience, and often there is no audience at all.91 
Likewise, and more importantly, when a government deprives a 
person of the right to an abortion, many people may be affected. 
Consider, for instance, an indigent, single woman who desires an 
abortion so that she might better provide for her already-born chil­
dren. If she is prevented from having an abortion - whatever one 
may think of that decision - her children and other family mem­
bers, her boyfriend, employer, and possibly state and federal relief 
programs, among others, would all be significantly affected. Even 
assuming a community-wide effect of free speech deprivation and 
an individual effect of other deprivations, however, the conclusion 
that, therefore, expression rights deserve special protection does 
not easily follow. The rights in the First and Fourteenth Amend­
ments are individual rights.92 Thus, their importance to the con-
586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply Salerno), as well as Establishment Clause cases, see 
Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District, 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1483 ( S.D. Miss. 1994) 
(holding that "the rigid dictates of Salerno do not apply in Establishment Clause cases," 
which are covered by the three-part Lemon test); Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 
741 F. Supp. 1386, 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (choosing to apply the Lemon test rather than 
Salerno). Under the Lemon test, a statute violates the Establishment Clause if it (i) does not 
have a secular purpose, (ii) if its principal or primary effect is to inhibit religion, or (iii) if it 
fosters an " 'excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1974)). 
88. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 {1946) ("When we balance the Constitu­
tional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and 
religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred 
position."); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 115 (1943) (mentioning the preferred 
position of freedoms of press, speech, and religion); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth 
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970) ("[P]referred status is the ultimate rationale of 
the overbreadth doctrine . . . .  "). 
89. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 10, at 884 n.192. But see a discussion of this issue in the 
very informative article, Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 
464 (1956). 
90. See Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HARV. 
L. REV. 1208, 1209 (1948). 
91. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 {1969) (holding that the First Amendment pro­
tects the private possession of obscene material). 
92. See GUNlHER, supra note 9, at lxvi-lxvii. 
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cemed individuals is a better yardstick by which to judge their 
significance than the ripple effect on a community when those 
rights are denied.93 On that individual level, it is safe to say that, at 
any given time, a woman may consider her right to an abortion 
more important than her right to free speech.94 
A second justification given for the preeminence of expression 
rights is that laws abridging rights other than those found in the 
First Amendment may give impetus to a movement to change the 
unjust law, while a law impairing free speech "restricts the 
processes by which the law is altered."95 Admitting that this state­
ment will be true in some rare cases - for instance, if a law re­
stricted political rallies at the state capital building - it is most 
often not true. Consider Jews for Jesus, 96 in which First Amend­
ment activity at the Los Angeles airport was banned. The invali­
dated law did not prevent the Jews for Jesus organization from 
protesting the airport restrictions at City Hall, or obtaining signa­
tures for a petition against it, or for voting for a politician who 
promised to fight to repeal the restriction. 
While the preeminence of the First Amendment might not jus­
tify restricting overbreadth analysis to the First Amendment, one 
alternatively might argue that overbreadth analysis should not be 
used in abortion cases because the abortion right is of particularly 
small consequence. Indeed, statements in judicial decisions leave 
room to believe that the right to choose to have an abortion is of 
less moment than any other fundamental right. For instance, even 
Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe, characterizes the abortion 
right as "limited. "97 Furthermore, states are permitted to express a 
preference for childbirth rather than abortion.9s The foregoing 
might be considered a principled basis for not extending over-
93. See Cahn, supra note 89, at 479 (arguing against the practice of balancing free speech 
rights against the interest of the community). If the community benefit of an individual's 
speech ranks as highly as this argument suggests, it is unclear why a state could not compel 
speech of certain individuals that is of particular benefit to the community. We know, how­
ever, that the recognized right not to speak, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), inter alia, would render the 
compulsion invalid. But see Schauer, supra note 72, at 691 (arguing that speech is unique in 
that the courts actually think of it as an affirmative good); LEE C. BoLUNGER, THE TOLER­
ANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExrnEMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9-10, 107 (1986) 
(stating that free speech theory has traditionally focused on the value of the speech, not its 
importance to an individual). 
94. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 265 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 
(1992)). 
95. Note, supra note 90, at 1209. 
96. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Commrs., 661 F. Supp. 1223 (C.D. Cal. 1985), 
affd., 785 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1986), affd., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
97. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 555 (1989) (Blackmun, J., con­
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
98. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 504-07. 
1460 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1443 
breadth analysis to abortion cases. But the fact that states can indi­
cate a preference for childbirth does not make the abortion right 
any different from the right of free expression; the state, after all, 
can express a preference for certain forms of speech, such as speech 
promoting democracy, in its funding decisions.99 Also, references 
to abortion as a limited right merely recognize that it must be 
weighed against the fetus's right to life. This, too, is no different 
from the First Amendment context, in which the right to free 
speech must be balanced against the rights of the community.mo 
Even if First Amendment rights are to be considered most im­
portant, or abortion rights least important, neither view justifies 
limiting the overbreadth doctrine to First Amendment jurispru­
dence. Here, unlike cases that have spawned announcements of the 
"preferred position" of the First Amendment, the First Amend­
ment is not being pitted against another right such as the abortion 
right.101 Extending overbreadth analysis to abortion laws does not 
denigrate the First Amendment in any way; it merely recognizes 
that rights found within the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause need to be safeguarded as well. 
2. The "Valid-Rule-of-Law" Theory Also Requires Extension to 
Abortion Cases 
Tue valid-rule-of-law theory, an alternative justification for 
overbreadth analysis, is the "third-party-standing" theory's only 
major competitor. Valid-rule-of-law theory insists that the over­
breadth doctrine has no relation to standing rules at au.102 As its 
name suggests, it begins with the premise that all litigants have the 
right to be judged by a valid rule of law.103 It further notes that 
some constitutional rules of law, but not others, make the validity 
99. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 509. 
100. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1063-65 {2d ed. 
1991) (reviewing the balancing approach to the First Amendment); see also Jerold H. Israel, 
Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 217-19 (stating that 
the overbreadth doctrine applies when the governmental interest sought to be implemented 
is too insubstantial, or at least insufficient in relation to the inhibitory effect on First Amend­
ment freedom). 
101. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 {1946) (holding that free speech rights 
have preeminence over property rights); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (same). 
102. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 39 {"In sum, over­
breadth analysis is concerned with the substance of constitutional review; it does not rely on 
any distinctive standing component."); Monaghan, supra note 40, at 283. For a modified 
version of Monaghan's approach, see Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional 
Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 10 CAL. L. REV. 1308 {1982). But see Robert Allen 
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 
{1962) (arguing that in overbreadth doctrine cases, the Supreme Court allows parties to as­
sert the rights of others). Monaghan's approach has been labeled an "attempt to discredit" 
overbreadth analysis. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 542. 
103. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 102, at 3. 
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of statutes dependent on whether they apply constitutionally to 
people other than the litigant. For instance, state legislatures must 
use the least restrictive means possible when restricting protected 
speech.104 One of the most convincing ways for a litigant to prove 
that the legislature did not use the least restrictive means possible is 
to demonstrate that the statute would prohibit the speech of a great 
number of people. Of course, these people will not be parties to 
the action in which the litigant makes this claim. According to the 
valid-rule-of-law theory, then, it is the constitutional rule of law at 
issue - here, the least-restrictive-means test - that makes it possi­
ble for the litigant to show that parties not before the court will be 
adversely affected, and not a special standing rule.105 If she can do 
so convincingly, she will have proved that the law is rotten at its 
core and, therefore, incapable of sustaining her conviction. 
In most instances, the applicable law does not make cases 
outside the court relevant to the validity of the law; after all, most 
government regulations are not subjected to a least-restrictive­
means test. For that majority of cases, impermissible applications 
are chipped away only through as-applied challenges.106 But when­
ever the rule of law requires a significant connection between the 
means and the ends of the statute, overbreadth analysis should be 
used: "This congruence requirement is of central importance not 
only in the First Amendment context but wherever any standard of 
review other than the rational basis test is mandated by the applica­
ble substantive constitutional law. Overbreadth challenges are, 
therefore, not confined to First Amendment adjudication."107 
While Casey established a standard that does not match the 
rigor of strict scrutiny,1os the undue-burden standard requires more 
104. See id. 
105. "Judicial conclusions of overbreadth or of the availability of less restrictive alterna­
tives are equivalents. They are simply different statements that other, more finely tuned 
means exist to vindicate any presumably valid state policies." Id. at 38 n.157 (citations omit­
ted). But see National Treasury Employees v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (arguing that the number of invalid applications required by overbreadth analysis 
is probably greater than the number of invalid applications required under the least­
restrictive-means test, thus suggesting a difference between the two). 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 22 (1960); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley 
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Monaghan, supra note 102, at 4. 
107. Monaghan, supra note 102, at 4; see also Redish, supra note 83, at 1034 (arguing that 
it is surely correct that the overbreadth doctrine applies outside the First Amendment 
context). 
108. Justice Scalia noted that the deferential undue-burden standard tolerates direct reg­
ulation of protected activity to a greater degree than the strict scrutiny test. See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 988 (1992) ( Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). Possibly anticipating its expansion to other contexts, Justice Scalia 
called the undue-burden standard "quite dangerous." Casey, 505 U. S. at 988 ( Scalia, J., con­
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun also asserted that 
application of strict scrutiny would have required the Court to strike down provisions which 
were upheld. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 932-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. City of Akron v. 
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than mere rationality and certainly requires adoption of less restric­
tive alternatives in some cases.109 The valid-rule-of-law theory, 
then, holds that overbreadth challenges may quite correctly be 
brought against restrictive abortion laws, whether or not the com­
plaining party has engaged in protected activity. The challenger 
would only have to show that, in some cases, the restrictions will 
operate as an undue burden. The availability of less restrictive 
means, if proven, would demonstrate that the law is invalid and de­
mand victory for the challenger. 
II. CASEYS LARGE-FRACTION TE ST I S  THE MO ST APPROPRIATE 
FORM OF 0VERBREADTH ANALY SI S  FOR ABORTION 
CA SE S  
Above, this Note defined overbreadth analysis as a doctrine 
which allows challengers to invalidate a law, regardless of the chal­
lenger's own activity, on the basis that some significant number of 
other people will be unconstitutionally restricted by the law. This 
definition leaves many questions unanswered, such as how many 
persons' protected conduct need be infringed before a court will 
declare a law unconstitutional, how convincing the challenger's 
proof of this infringement must be, and the like. Because these 
questions can be answered in a variety of ways, overbreadth analy­
sis can take on many different forms.110 In its First Amendment 
cases - purportedly the only context in which overbreadth chal­
lenges are allowed111 - the Supreme Court has developed particu­
lar answers to those questions. This Note will refer to the more 
general theory as simply "overbreadth analysis," and the particular 
First Amendment formulation as "Broadrick overbreadth analysis," 
after the case that formulated it.112 
While this Note has argued that facial challenges to restrictive 
abortion statutes should be, and have been, measured by an over­
breadth standard rather than the Salerno standard, it remains to be 
considered exactly what species of overbreadth analysis should be 
employed in such cases.113 Broadrick overbreadth analysis invali-
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 426 U.S. 416, 463 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the undue-burden analysis does indeed use strict scrutiny, but only after a 
threshold determination that the statute in question constitutes an undue burden). 
109. But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 988-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty in de­
fining a "due" burden). 
110. Cf. Fallon, supra note 10, at 868 n.94 ("I do think it implausible, or at least mislead­
ing, to claim that the Constitution requires exactly the overbreadth doctrine that we have 
now, or indeed an overbreadth doctrine defined by any specific set of doctrinal rules."). 
111. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). 
112. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1972). 
113. There is more than one possible formulation of the overbreadth doctrine. See supra 
note 44 and accompanying text; cf. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768 n.21 ("Overbreadth challenges are 
only one type of facial attack."). 
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dates statutes capable of a substantial number of impermissible ap­
plications judged in relation to the statute's sweep.114 The Casey 
overbreadth standard - invalidating statutes which operate uncon­
stitutionally in a large fraction of the relevant cases - is but an 
alternative formulation of the overbreadth doctrine. This section 
explains how an analysis under the Casey standard should proceed. 
In doing so, it concludes that the careful attention to facts required 
under the Casey standard suggests that it is superior to Broadrick 
overbreadth analysis for use in abortion cases. 
The Casey standard invalidates statutes that operate unconstitu­
tionally in a "large fraction" of the cases in which they are "rele­
vant. "115 Admittedly, the course of a proper review under this 
standard is less than self-evident. The three controlling principles 
of the test, however, can provide a basis for consistent and judicious 
application of a Casey standard of overbreadth analysis. Section 
II.A describes the first guiding principle of Casey, an attempt to 
discover the actual effect that a challenged statute is having, or will 
have, in our society. Section II.B lays out the second (and related) 
principle, the Casey test's exclusive focus on those people whose 
conduct the statute may influence. Third, as section II.C explains, 
although the plurality used mathematical language in referring to a 
large fraction of cases, the test does not strive for scientific preci­
sion. Judges who give due respect to these principles may fashion a 
coherent body of abortion law which protects the abortion right up­
held in Casey while correcting for problems associated with 
Broadrick overbreadth analysis. 
A. The Factual Record Should Be Extremely Important to a 
Court Applying the Casey Test 
In order to determine whether the Pennsylvania statute at issue 
would operate unconstitutionally in a large fraction of the cases in 
which it was relevant, the Casey plurality exhaustively reviewed fac­
tual data regarding spousal abuse and other sociological studies, ul­
timately concluding that a husband-notification provision would 
seriously affect the decision of some women to choose an abor­
tion.116 While some have attributed the lengthy factual review to 
114. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 n.61 (1981) (arguing that overbreadth challenges may not be 
made by those whose conduct falls into the "hard core" of the protected area). For a history 
of the overbreadth doctrine, see Fallon, supra note 10, at 863-64; Redish, supra note 83, at 
1031. 
115. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
116. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-92. The Supreme Court was actually reviewing the Dis­
trict Court's 387 findings of fact. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1329-
72 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
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the nature of the undue-burden test,117 the very nature of the large­
fraction test also demands intense attention to facts. 
For an illustration, assume that the Supreme Court decided that 
Pennsylvania's twenty-four hour waiting period acted as an undue 
burden on one specific group: poor women who must travel far to 
obtain an abortion.11s If Utah thereafter passed a restrictive abor­
tion law with an identical twenty-four hour waiting period require­
ment, and a facial attack was brought against it, precedent would 
obviate the need for courts to determine whether the statute places 
an undue burden on poor women who must travel far to get an 
abortion in Utah. 
Nonetheless, if the Casey standard for facial attacks were em­
ployed, those challenging the Utah statute on its face would still 
have to show that it acts as an unconstitutional restriction in a large 
fraction of the cases in which it is relevant.119 They could do this 
most effectively by entering (what would be favorable) factual evi­
dence regarding the economic circumstance of women in Utah who 
seek abortions (impoverished), the costs of abortion in Utah (high), 
and the location of abortion providers in Utah (few and far be­
tween). These facts best answer the question before the Court: 
Will the provision often operate unconstitutionally in practice in 
Utah? Under the Casey standard, unlike Broadrick overbreadth 
analysis, it is not enough for a party or judge to hypothesize a "sub­
stantial" number of women who, on account of their financial con­
dition, will be burdened by the waiting period. A judge must 
instead determine how many of those women really exist, and what 
fraction of the abortion-seeking population that would not other-
117. They are not incorrect to do so; the undue-burden test does in fact require courts to 
entertain the elusive, fact-based question of whether a law places a "substantial obstacle" in 
front of a woman who has chosen to undergo an abortion procedure. See Tholen & Baird, 
supra note 11, at 980. 
118. The Court noted that it was a "close[ ] question" whether the 24-hour waiting period 
placed an undue burden on those women who must travel far to obtain an abortion, those 
who face increased exposure to harassment by anti-abortion protesters, those with the fewest 
financial resources, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, 
employers, or others. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86. A more developed factual record may 
yet persuade the Court that a 24-hour waiting period acts as an undue burden towards some 
women. See Casey, 505 U. S. at 887 ("[O]n the record before us • • •  we are not convinced that 
the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden." (emphasis added)). But see Dorf, 
supra note 7, at 276 (incorrectly stating that the Court found the 24-hour waiting provision to 
be an undue burden towards rural and poor women, but not a large enough number of 
women to justify facial invalidation). 
· 
119. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993); Casey, 505 
U.S. at 895. Of course, in the case of an as-applied challenge, a Utah court would only need 
ask whether the woman before it is poor. 
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wise wait twenty-four hours they represent.120 The best way to do 
that is by a review of reliable statistics.121 
Thus, the Casey standard requires courts to concern themselves 
with the peculiarities of geography,122 job setting,123 and other per­
tinent circumstances surrounding any allegedly unconstitutional 
statute's operation.124 The fact that the economic condition of 
women varies from state to state means that a finding on the consti­
tutionality vel non of identical statutes might not carry over from 
one state to the next under the large-fraction test.12s Courts adopt­
ing the Casey standard have often foregone a state-specific factual 
analysis, however, for the much easier, though incorrect, method of 
using Casey's judgment on particular Pennsylvania provisions as a 
dispositive judgment of the overbreadth of another state's analo­
gous restrictions.126 
Of course, the above should not be taken to mean that the con­
tours of the right to an abortion vary across states under the Casey 
test. Rather, the class of persons towards whom the statute acts 
unconstitutionally - a group whose characteristics are uniform 
120. To understand why abortion-seeking women who would not otherwise wait 24 hours 
are the denominator of the Casey fraction, see infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. 
121. See Schafer, 113 S. Ct. at 1669 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of stay and injunc­
tion pending appeal) (noting that the Casey large-fraction standard requires a review of the 
facts). The reliability of statistics, of course, will be hotly litigated in a court using the Casey 
standard. 
122. The small number of abortion clinics in a given state might, for example, make a 
statutory 24-hour waiting period burdensome to a greater number of women in that state 
than in Pennsylvania. Therefore, lower courts have been misguided in analogizing to the 
provisions upheld in Casey without looking at the realities of life in the forum state. 
123. A ban on political activity by government employees may be particularly "chilling" 
if, for instance, the supervisors of those employees informally enforce the ban. In such a 
situation, see, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 617-18 (1972), the state employees 
are likely to be deterred from "speaking," and unlikely ever to raise First Amendment con­
cerns in a defense to a state prosecution. 
124. See supra note 80. The fact that a woman must consult an informed doctor and 
medical staff before obtaining an abortion suggests that restrictive statutes will "chill" the 
exercise of her right. 
125. For a discussion of the disparity of abortion availability across states and counties, 
see Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and 
Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1323, 1470-75 (1995). 
126. See Judges, supra note 125, at 1454 n.447; Tholen & Baird, supra note 11, at 1003; 
Valerie J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard - ls It a Lost Cause? The Undue 
Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 309 n.94 (1994). 
Plaintiffs in a case challenging a restrictive Mississippi abortion statute apparently recognized 
that the Casey overbreadth standard required a state-specific factual inquiry. The plaintiffs 
unwisely chose to use some down-home language in making their correct argument: 
In their post-Casey supplemental brief, plaintiffs reduce their argument to the amor­
phism "Mississippi ain't Pennsylvania[,]"[ ] stating, "The record in this case proves what 
all know empirically: Mississippi ain't Pennsylvania." This speaks volumes about the 
invalidity of their challenge to the Mississippi Act on its face; in fact, no more really 
need be said. 
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992). The court here was perhaps too angry 
to get the law right. 
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throughout the nation - simply might be so large in one particular 
state, and-so dubious in another, that the interest in protecting par­
ties not before the court can justify the extreme remedy of facial 
invalidation in only the first case. In the other, that interest is not 
of sufficient volume to outweigh the government's interest in en­
forcing its law against those who are not protected.121 
Casey's focus on the actual number of unconstitutional applica­
tions that will arise differs from Broadrick overbreadth analysis, 
which allows parties and courts to base a constitutional conclusion 
on hypothetical situations. This difference arises from the fact that 
Broadrick overbreadth analysis deals with applications which a stat­
ute is "capable of," realistic or not, while the Casey standard deals 
with the actual "operation" of a law.12s Admittedly, some over­
breadth opinions attempt to ground their analysis in reality.129 
Nonetheless, the Court continues to posit hypotheticals without 
empirical basis,130 and no overbreadth analysis has gone into the 
factual detail that Casey did. 
Intense factual review may place a certain tax on judicial econ­
omy. It may also cause courts to dispute the validity of statistics 
among themselves in a way more suited to a legislature than a judi­
ciary.131 Nonetheless, a reliance on available facts should calm a 
sometimes-voiced fear about the overbreadth doctrine: it is "too 
abstract."132 Few complaints of abstractness will be heard from 
those who have waded through the 387 factual findings in Casey. 133 
127. Of course, even the notion that the extent of a specific person's constitutional pro­
tection depends on where she lives is not foreign to the Constitution. See Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 {1973) (making obscenity exception to the First Amendment dependent, inter 
a/ia, on community standards). 
128. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-95 (1992) {plurality opinion). 
129. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 n.6 (1987) (noting that although evi· 
dence regarding the actual application and enforcement of the law is not necessary for facial 
invalidation, such evidence has been found to be probative of the law's potential for uncon­
stitutional application, that is, probative of its overbreadth) (cited in Rachel N. Pine, The 
Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 699 n.192 
(1988)); Hodell v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 723-25 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting the 
use of hypotheticals); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
801 (1983) (stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate a realistic danger that the challenged 
ordinance would compromise First Amendment freedoms). 
130. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1993). 
131. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 224 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he legis­
lature is not required to prove before a court that its statistics are perfect."). 
132. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 861. Despite this fear, Professor Fallon accepts over­
breadth analysis in First Amendment cases. He does not explain, or even argue, how over­
breadth is any less abstract in the First Amendment context than others. Instead, he makes a 
judgment, not thoroughly explained, that abstractness is sufferable when First Amendment 
rights are involved because those are the most important. See id. at 884 n.192. 
133. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1329-72 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
Moreover, the Court has been more concerned with tying its findings to the facts of the world 
in other areas of the law. When deciding whether a "rational basis" supports a statute, the 
Justices often speculate on the hypothetical rational basis a legislature might have had for 
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Of course, it is possible to imagine situations in which reliable 
statistics are not available. For instance, a future challenger might 
claim that materials provided by the state to women choosing to 
have an abortion were so graphic and disturbing that they created 
an undue burden on the right to have an abortion for a large frac­
tion of relevant women. In that case, statistics probably could not 
capture accurately the number of women who faced an undue bur­
den, as that estimate would rely so heavily on mental processes. 
Likewise, certain statistics - such as those regarding instances of 
rape - may be inherently unreliable. ' 
The plurality, unfortunately, gives no direction on what to do 
when statistics prove unhelpful. Justice Blackmun proposed a sen­
sible solution to this problem by noting that the Casey overbreadth 
test should be made with reference to expert testimony, empirical 
studies, and common sense.134 The Court should simply use its own 
understanding of the world as a guide in determining whether the 
statute will operate unconstitutionally in a large fraction of cases. 
Where statistics are unhelpful, therefore, the analysis of abortion 
cases should closely resemble Broadrick overbreadth doctrine, the 
First Amendment analysis that does not require a close attention to 
factual investigation. This approach, however, should be used only 
as a last resort. 
B.  The Large Fraction Standard Requires an Exclusive Focus on 
Relevant Cases 
The second, and most important, principle of Casey overbreadth 
analysis is an extension of the first. The standard demands not only 
a focus on the actual effect of a statute, it demands attention to the 
challenged statute's effect on a specific group of people: those who 
desire to engage in protected activity proscribed by the particular 
provision being tested, or, in other words, those whose conduct will 
passing certain legislation rather than consider its actual purpose. The Court very nearly 
accepted the argument that when conducting this inquiry, which it does quite often, it should 
look to find the actual basis rather than a posited one. See GuNTiiER, supra note 9, at 621 
n.9. The argument for a focus on the legislature's articulated purpose was posed in Gerald 
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972). Some 
members of the Court accepted the "real world" focus outright, see GuNTHER, supra note 9, 
at 621 n.9, and others balked, presumably only out of the fear of imposing requirements on 
the legislative body, see id. In the overbreadth area, by contrast, a concern with facts does 
not saddle state legislatures with additional responsibilities, and thereby result in an unwise 
intrusion into the legislative realm. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 179 (1980) ("It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact 
underlay the legislative decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body 
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." (citation omitted)). 
134. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 925 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
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actually be changed by the existence of the law.135 That is, the de­
nominator of the large fraction must be ascertained. Defining this 
group has proved troublesome.136 
In Casey, the Court emphati�ally rejected Pennsylvania's argu­
ment that the husband notification provision passed the large­
fraction test because the great majority of pregnant women volun­
tarily notify their husbands of their desire to have an abortion. It 
was willing to accept that only one percent of women seeking abor­
tions would not notify their husbands voluntarily. The Court noted, 
however, that: 
The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom 
the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for con­
sistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it 
affects. For example, we would not say that a law which requires a 
newspaper to print a candidate's reply to an unfavorable editorial is 
valid on its face because most newspapers would adopt the policy 
even absent the law. The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the 
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the 
' law is irrelevant.131 
Thus, in the Utah example above, a court could not find the statute 
constitutional because poor women are a small fraction of all 
women in Utah and, thus, do not constitute a large fraction of the 
cases. The group restricted by the law is those women who, absent 
the law, would not have waited twenty-four hours for an abortion. 
A court, therefore, must ask what percentage of women who would 
not otherwise wait twenty-four hours before getting an abortion suf­
fer an undue burden because of their poverty. After shifting its fo­
cus, a court may well find that poor women make up a large 
fraction of those who are restricted.138 
It is here that the Casey standard makes its great departure from 
standard overbreadth analysis. Casey asks simply: Will this statute 
prevent citizens who desire to act in protected ways from doing so? 
The way Casey gets right to this question, indeed the great virtue of 
the Casey test, lies in its immediate removal of the irrelevant cases 
- those cases in which the chilling effect has no conceivable chance 
to operate. 
In contrast to Casey, Broadrick overbreadth analysis uses the 
entire population regulated by the challenged statute as its frame of 
reference. The number of impermissible applications is to be 
135. See 505 U.S. at 894-95. 
136. See, e.g., Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1489 (D. Utah 
1994). 
137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
138. It may be, for instance, that those with enough money to do so tend to see a doctor 
more than once before having an abortion, thus independently creating a 24-hour waiting 
period. 
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judged in relation to the statute's entire sweep. Using this formula­
tion of overbreadth analysis, Pennsylvania's husband-notification 
provision would not have been struck down. While Casey logically 
looked first to those who might be chilled, Broadrick overbreadth 
analysis looks first to all pregnant married women; any woman with 
a husband, after all, is within the sweep of the husband-notification 
provision. Ninety-five percent of married women notify their hus­
bands voluntarily,139 thus, the challenge would have failed under 
Broadrick. 
The major fl.aw with this approach is that it allows the statute's 
sweep - which may have little connection to the amount of chilling 
taking place - to control the analysis. For example, assume Penn­
sylvania passes a criminal statute regulating one million people. As 
a result, 5000 people change their behavior to conform with the law; 
most were in compliance with it already. Of the 5000 who altered 
their behavior, 4800 ceased engaging in constitutionally protected 
activity; the conduct of the other 200 was not protected. By most 
measures, 4800 is not a large number when compared to one mil­
lion. Thus, a challenge under Broadrick would fail. Nonetheless, 
the chilling effect in this case worked nearly to the limit. The Casey 
standard recognizes this by using the group of 5000 - the group 
that was actually chilled - as the starting point of the analysis. By 
any measure, 4800 over 5000 is a large fraction. This, of course, 
leads to the next question: Precisely what is a large fraction? 
C. The Large Fraction Test Cannot Be Performed With 
Mathematical Accuracy 
If the plurality believed that their reference to a large fraction of 
cases demanded scientifically precise analysis, Justice Rehnquist 
would have been right to criticize it as he did: 
The joint opinion concentrates on the situations involving battered 
women and unreported spousal assault, and assumes, without any 
support in the record, that these instances constitute a "large frac­
tion" of those cases in which women prefer not to notify their hus­
bands . . . . This assumption is not based on any hard evidence, 
however. And were it helpful to an attempt to reach a desired result, 
one could just as easily assume that the battered women situations 
form 100 percent of the cases where women desire not to notify, or 
that they constitute only 20 percent of those cases.140 
This passage mistakenly implies a kind of mathematical exactitude 
to the term "large fraction." Any overbreadth theory will have a 
high-water mark that, when exceeded, signals a constitutional viola-
139. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. 
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 973-74 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist called for the continued vitality of Salerno. See Casey, 
505 U. S. at 972-73. 
1470 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 95:1443 
tion.141 Just because we can only estimate the water level at any 
given time, and that it cannot be measured with certainty, is irrele­
vant.142 Certainly, the elusive nature of that inquiry has not 
stopped the Court from applying it in First Amendment cases. The 
Casey standard recognizes the inherent imprecision and corrects it 
as much as possible, that is, by forcing judges to justify their deci­
sions with proven factual circumstances whenever possible. Indeed, 
despite the dissent's remarks, the Casey plurality did base its find­
ings on hard evidence.143 
CONCL U SION 
With Roe, the Supreme Court became the nation's primary arbi­
ter of abortion rights.144 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions 
mapped a rocky rather than smooth course, suggesting the Court 
141. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 40, at 193 (noting the speculative nature of the over­
breadth inquiry); Fallon, supra note 10, at 893 {"The hard question, nonnatively as well as 
doctrinally, is how the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth ought to be gauged."); see also 
C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NomE DAME L. REV. 
862, 907 {1985) (noting the empirical nature of the overbreadth inquiry and the Burger 
Court's failure to determine to what extent a judgment on overbreadth should be qualitative 
or quantitative). On the question of what number of unconstitutional applications is "sub­
stantial, " see National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (arguing that the number of invalid applications required is probably greater 
than the number of invalid applications required under the least-restrictive-means test); Red­
ish, supra note 83, at 1064 (stating that the substantiality requirement is satisfied if a majority 
of applications are unconstitutional), see also Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 
F.2d 1547, 1563-66 (7th Cir. 1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (discussing the relation between the 
two standards). 
142. Another commentator has perhaps said it best: 
[W]hile it is true that there are behavioral assumptions that provide the basis for chilling 
effect analysis, the lack of any ability to quantify or test these assumptions does not 
diminish the significance of the chilling effect as a substantive doctrine. The doctrine 
flows from the relationship between our recognition of the inevitability of error and our 
preference for a particular type of error; and it is the existence of this relationship, rather 
than the scientific accuracy of the predictions of human behavior, which justifies the 
fonnulation of substantive rules in this area. 
Schauer, supra note 72, at 688-89. 
143. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-93 (citing AMA COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, VIO­
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1991); Nancy M. Shields & Christine R. Hanneke, Battered Wives 
Reactions to Marital Rape, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE 
RESEARCH 131, 144 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN SYNDROME 27-28 (1984); Tracy Bennet Herbert et al., Coping with an Abusive Rela· 
tionship: I. How and Why do Women Stay?, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 311 (1991); B.E. 
Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. NATL. AssN. Soc. WORKERS 
350, 352 {1985)); James A. Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the 
United States, 1976-85, 19 AM. J. Pun. HEALTii 595 (1989); Domestic Violence: Terrorism in 
the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the 
Senate Comm on Labor and Human Resources, lOlst Cong. 3 (1990); Barbara Ryan & Eric 
Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal Notification and Marital Interaction, 
51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 44 (1989). 
144. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1988) ( Scalia, J., con­
curring). Roe in fact generated, more than it built upon, the national abortion controversy. 
See Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 27 
(1992). 
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might nullify the abortion right at any moment.145 Our nation, ever 
watchful of the federal courts' abortion decisions - and driven to a 
fever pitch by the emotional nature of the debate - would cer­
tainly find any case disposed of based on the standard for evaluat­
ing facial attacks anticlimactic. Nonetheless ,  that issue is, 
analytically speaking, central to the abortion cases. The standard 
determines how "active" the federal courts will be in striking down 
overly restrictive state statutes146 - an issue just as important, if 
less absorbing, than the litany of other concerns that abortion cases 
raise. Since Casey, a decision which has momentarily solidified the 
Court's position on abortion rights, it has become an even more 
important argument for those who wish to preserve the facial valid­
ity of laws restricting access to abortion. 
Overbreadth analysis has been applied in abortion cases, and 
should continue to be applied in the form of the Casey test. Besides 
its harmony with prior decisions, use of the large-fraction test ac­
knowledges that restrictive abortion statutes hang like a sword, chil­
ling behavior that has been declared constitutionally protected -
regardless of the fact that "some of us as individuals find abortion 
offensive to our most basic principles of morality."147 The alterna­
tive Salerno no-set-of-circumstances test lays to the side. In the 
abortion context, that standard is impossible to meet, and, there­
fore, can be used as camouflage reasoning that denies the abortion 
right in fact while preserving it in theory. Furthermore, the Salerno 
test finds no pedigree in Supreme Court decisions on abortion. It 
has no place in an area of the law where personal inclinations al­
ready threaten to dominate. 
145. See Walter Dellinger & Gene Sperline, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Re­
treat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83 (1989) (noting the imperilled status of the 
right to an abortion). 
146. See M. Chester Nolte, Invalid for Vagueness or Overbreadth: Challenging Prohibi­
tions of Protected Speech, 30 WEST'S Enuc. LAW REP. 1017-18 (suggesting that the over­
breadth standard is a question of judicial activism). 
147. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
